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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWIN B. GIVAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
FRANK LAMBETH, sometimes known as 
FRANK R. LAMBETH, an unmarried man ; 
NORMAN W. ESMEIER and CORRINE L. 
ESMEIER, his wife; T. THALLO LAMBETH 
and MRS. T. 'THALLO LAMBETH, his wife; 
KEITH B. LAMBETH and MRS. KEITH B. 
LAMBETH, his wife; ELLIS B. LAMBETH 
and MRS. ELLIS B. LAMBETH, his wife: 
AUBRA B. LAMBETH and MRS. AUBRA B. 
LAMBETH, hi's wife; RAMON A S. WOOL-
SEY, and LA RAE B. LAMBETH, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BERTRAND 'T. GIVAN, INA GIVAN and 
HELEN GIVAN, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
-vs.-
FRANK LAMBETH, sometimes known as 
FRANK R. LAMBETH, un unmarried man; 
and NORMAN W. ESMEIER, 
Third Party Defendant.c;. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 8955 
The defendants have little quarrel with plaintiffs' 
statement of the nature of the case, agreeing with that 
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statement except for the feeling that it must be set forth 
that both by the law and the instructions of the court the 
findings of the jury in the case were advisory only. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts made by the plaintiff is also 
fair as far as it goes, with the exception of several in-
stances we feel to be in error, these portions will be 
pointed out in this statement of facts augmenting that 
of the plaintiff. 
With regard to the corrections: 
1. On page 7, line 16, of plaintiff's brief, it indicates 
that Pacific Finance Company on June 19, 1953 had taken 
a judgment against Givans, Inc., for approximately 
$10,000.00, referring to Exhibit 16. Exhibit 16 as part 
of the record shows that the $10,000.00 judgment was 
entered by Farn1ers State Bank on Septen1ber 25, 1953. 
Further, this judgment arose from the residue of the ob-
ligation to Farmers State Bank in the sum of $12,000.00 
which was contained in the obligations of Givans, Inc., 
and set forth in the agree1nent at the ti1ne defendants 
purchased the corporate 8tock. 
2. With regard to manual delivery of the deeds, 
Keith Lambeth places the tilne in July, 1952 (T. 415). 
3. The $13,700.00 nwrtgage to Pacific Finance was 
given for consideration which would increase the assets 
of Givans, Inc. equally with the increase in the liabilities 
(plaintiff's brief, page 9). 
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4. The mortgage given to L. C. Miles on July 1, 
1953, was a renewal of a debt set forth in the stock sale 
agreement of January 6, 1953. 
5. Each of the Exhibits 7, 8, and 9 (the three deeds), 
and Exhibit 10 (the bill of sale) were executed by Frank 
Lambeth on August 1, 1950, and were manually delivered 
to Keith Lambeth in the summer of 1952. 
FURTHER STATEMENT OF FACTS BY 
DEFENDANTS 
The youngest of the Lambeth boys, Aubra, attained 
his majority in 1942 (T. 180). All of the boys worked 
for the sheep operation from 1934 to and including 1952 
and never drew full wages (T. 401-502). 
With regard to the solvency of Frank Lambeth at 
the time of executing the bill of sale and deeds in August, 
1950, Frank had no obligations not secured by property. 
At the time of the delivery of the deeds in the summer 
of 1952, he had no obligations not secured by property. 
On May 18, 1953, when the deeds and bill of sale were 
recorded, Frank Lambeth was indebted jointly and 
severally with Norman Esmeier to the Givan brothers 
for the four notes set forth in plaintiff's complaint, two 
being payable at $72.61 per month and two being payable 
November 30, 1953, with a sixty-day grace period. These 
notes were secured by recourse to all the corporate stock 
held by Lambeth and Esmeier consisting of 1980 of the 
2,000 shares issued (addendum Exhibit 28). 
The court held in its findings of fact on the first 
part of the trial that the defendants took over the busi-
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ness and its assets rather than the stock (R. 60). The 
court further found that the assets of the corporation 
on February 18, 1953, were in excess of $100,000.00 (R. 
58). Concerning the value of the assets of Givans, Inc. 
in February, 1953, Bertrand Givan testified that the 
building was worth $70,000.00, the ground $20,000.00 to 
$25,000.00, used cars $10,000.00, tools and equipment 
$15,000.00 to $18,000.00, and stock between $15,000.00 and 
$20,000.00 (T. 107-108), or a total value computed from 
his lowest figure of $130,000.00, besides notes and ac-
counts receivable in the sum of $13,000.00 to $14,000.00 
(T. 108). 
Edwin Givan testified that in February, 1953, th~ 
garage building was worth $70,000.00, the ground $20,-
000.00 ( T. 137), parts $14,000.00 to $18,000.00, equipment 
and tools $15,000.00, oil and grease $1,000.00 to $1,500.00 
(T. 138), used cars $10,000.00, furniture and fixtures 
$5,000.00, and accounts and notes receivable $8,000.00 to 
$10,000.00, or a total at his lowest figures of $143,000.00 
worth of assets (T. 139). The liabilities at this time were 
set forth in the agreements between the parties and 
totaled $57,850.00. 
There is no showing of an increase or decrease in the 
assets of the corporation between the date of sale and the 
date of recording the deeds and bill of sale, Exhibits 3, 
7, 8, 9, and 10, with the exception of a $13,700.00 n1ortgage 
to Pacific Finance on l\Ia~r 1~, 1953 (Exhibit 13), which 
was for value received and would 1nake no difference in 
the solvency of the corporation as it shows an equal in-
crease in assets and liabilities. 
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Frank Lambeth has a monthly income for life inde-
pendent of the sheep business and the garage business 
in the sum of $146.00 per month (T. 307-308). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. 
THE COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN ITS FINDINGS 
AS 1TO THE SOLVENCY OF FRANK LAMBETH ON MAY 
18, 1953, AND IN FINDING THAT THE TRANSFER OF THE 
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY, WHETHER AT THAT 
TIME OR UPON MANUAL DELIVERY IN 'THE SUMMER 
OF 1952, WAS NOT IN FRAUD OF CREDITORS. 
(a) THE BURDEN OF SHOWING INSOLVENCY IS 
ON THE PLAINTIFF AND THE EVIDENCE SHOWS LAM-
BETH TO HAVE BEEN SOLVENT ON AUGUST 1, 1950 
WHEN 'THE DEEDS WERE EXECUTED; IN THE SUMMER 
OF 1952 WHEN THE DEEDS AND BILL OF SALE WERE 
DELIVERED; IN MAY, 1953, WHEN THE DOCUMENTS 
WERE RECORDED, AS SOLVENCY IS DEFINED IN 25-1-2, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
(b) THERE IS A WEALTH OF EVIDENCE OF CON-
SIDERA1TION FOR THE TRANSFER OF THE REAL ES-
TATE AND SHEEP OPERATION REPRESENTED BY EX-
HIBITS 7, 8, 9 AND 10. 
(c) THE TRANSFER BEING PRIOR TO 'THE 
TIME THE GIVANS BECAME CREDITORS OF LAMBETH, 
A SHOWING OF ACTUAL INTENT TO DEFRAUD IS NEC-
ESSARY WHETHER THE TRANSFER WAS FOR FAIR 
CONSIDERATION OR, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS VOL-
UNTARY. 
(d) 'THE DELIVERY IN THE SUMMER OF 1952 DOES 
NOT SHOW AN INTENT ON THE PART OF FRANK LAM_ 
BETH TO DIVEST HIMSELF OF HIS PROPERTY IMMEDI-
ATELY BEFORE ENTERING INTO A SUBSTANTIAL 
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BUSINESS IN WHICH HE CONTEMPLATED CONTRACT-
ING DEBTS BEYOND HIS ABILITY TO PAY. 
(e) BADGES OF FRAUD. 
(f and g) THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTION THAT FRANK LAMBETH RE-
TAINED THE LAND OR GOODS IN HIS POSSESSION OR 
UNDER HIS CONTROL. 
(h) 'THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE 
CREATION OF A TRUST FOR FRANK LAMBETH. 
POINTS 2. and 3. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN PARA-
GRAPHS 6 AND 7 OF THE JUDGMENT. 
POINTS 4, 5, and 6. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUSTAINING DEFEND-
ANTS' OBJECTION 'TO PROFFERED EXHIBITS 13, 14, 15, 
AND THE DEPOSITION OF THE WITNESS SCOVILLE. 
POINT 7. 
THERE IS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S F AlLURE TO 
ADMIT FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE JURY EVI-
DENCE CONSISTING OF THE LAMBETHS' CHECKING 
ACCOUNT FROM JUNE 1952 TO AND INCLUDING AUGUST 
1953. 
POINT 8. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
ARGF~IE~T 
POINT 1. 
THE COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN ITS FINDINGS 
AS 'TO THE SOLVENCY OF FRANK LAMBETH ON MAY 
18, 1953, AND IN FINDING THAT THE TRANSFER OF THE 
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY, WHETHER AT THAT 
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TIME OR UPON MANUAL DELIVERY IN 'THE SUMMER 
OF 1952, WAS NOT IN FRAUD OF CREDITORS. 
(a) THE BURDEN OF SHOWING INSOLVENCY IS 
ON THE PLAINTIFF AND THE EVIDENCE SHOWS LAM-
BETH TO HAVE BEEN SOLVENT ON AUGUST 1, 1950 
WHEN 1THE DEEDS WERE EXECUTED; IN THE SUMMER 
OF 1952 WHEN THE DEEDS AND BILL OF SALE WERE 
DELIVERED; IN MAY, 1953, WHEN THE DOCUMENTS 
WERE RECORDED, AS SOLVENCY IS DEFINED IN 25-1-2, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
25-1-2 "INSOLVENCY. - A person is in-
solvent when the present fair salable value of 
his assets is less than the amount that will be re-
quired to satisfy his probable liability on his 
existing debts as they become absolute and ma-
tured. 
"In determining whether a partnership is in-
solvent there shall be added to the partnership 
property the present fair salable value of the 
separate assets of each general partner in excess 
of the amount probably sufficient to meet the 
claims of his separate creditors, and also the 
amount of any unpaid subscription to the partner-
ship of each limited partner; provided, the present 
fair salable value of the assets of such limited 
partner is probably sufficient to pay his debts, 
including such unpaid subscription." 
Frank Lambeth and Norman Esmeier entered into 
a joint enterprise for the purchase of all but 20 shares of 
Givans, Inc. stock by an agreement dated January 6, 1953 
(R. 20-22) and an addendum to that agreement dated 
February 18, 1953 (R. 23) for the purchase price of 
$50,400.00 (T. 3), of which $16,000.00 was paid in cash 
by Lambeth and the balance to be paid by four notes as 
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set forth in the plaintiff's complaint. The sellers express-
ly retained full recourse to the stock to secure the notes, 
a statement regarding recourse being found in the ad-
dendum (R. 23). The assets of the corporation were 
found by the court to be in excess of $100,000.00 (Find-
ing 7, R. 58). This finding, prepared by the plaintiff, 
was based on the testimony of the plaintiff Edwin Givan 
and his brother Bertrand Givan, who had been up to that 
time president and vice president, respectively, of Givans, 
Inc. 
Edwin, testifying as to the value of the assets of 
the corporation in February, 1953, testified to a minimum 
value of $143,000.00, including value of the building and 
grounds at $90,000.00 to $95,000.00 (T. 137-139). The 
minimum figure from Bertrand's testimony (T. 107-109) 
was $131,000.00, including $90,000.00 to $95,000.00 for the 
building and grounds and not including the notes or 
accounts receivable. The liabilities of the corporation 
were set forth in the sale agreen1ent between the parties 
to this lawsuit as $57,850.00. 
The interests of both Esn1eier and Lmnbeth in the 
stock of the corporation is jointly attributable to the 
payment of the $34,500.00 \Yorth of notes due to the 
Givans for determining the question of solvency of either, 
under the second paragraph of :25-1-:2. rC~l. 1953, supra. 
There is no showing of a substantial fluctuation in 
the value of the assets of Givans, Inc. between February 
18, and May 18, 1953, when the deeds and bill of sale in 
eontroversy were recorded. There is not a scintilla of 
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evidence regarding the diminution value of the ground 
and building valued by plaintiff's own testimony at $90,-
000.00 to $95,000.00. The same fixtures and equipment 
were there with only three months' depreciation and the 
only evidence regarding the parts inventory is Frank 
Lambeth's statement on examination by plaintiff's coun-
sel that the assets were greater on May 18, 1953 than on 
February 18, 1953 (T. 239-242). 
Plaintiff makes much of the court's refusal to admit 
pleadings and files foreign to this suit and evidence of 
the L. C. ~![iles mortgage in July of 1953 and the Farmers 
State Bank judgment on September 25, 1953, even in 
view of the fact that these were obligations against the 
corporation at the time of the stock transaction between 
the parties to this suit. 
The plaintiff ignores the fact that under 25-1-2, 
UCA 1953, Esmeier's interest in the corporation was 
equally attributable to payment of the notes sued on as 
was Lambeth's and the entire interest purchased by the 
agreements of January 6, and February 18, 1953, is sub-
ject to the notes, which makes the plaintiff a creditor and 
the entire interest is to be computed in determining Lan1-
beth's solvency, rather than a one-half interest, as indi-
cated by the plaintiff's brief at page 26. The plaintiff, 
on the question of solvency, also fails to consider that the 
deeds and bill of sale were executed on August 1, 1950 
(R. 87) and delivered in the summer of 1952 (R. 87). 
In the final analysis at the time of recording the 
deeds in May, 1953, defendants Esmeier and Lambeth 
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held a 1980/2000 interest in assets rated by the plaintiff 
and by Bertrand Givan, plaintiff's witness and initial 
payee on two of the notes sued on, as having a value in 
excess of $130,000.00, against which there were liabilities 
in the sum of $57,850.00 as set forth by the agreement 
between the parties, which leaves after the deduction 
of the $16,000.00 cash payment acknowledged by the 
agreement a minin1um of $72,150.00 worth of assets to 
secure $34,500 worth of notes for which the plaintiff held 
recourse to the 1980 shares of stock. 
Plaintiff contends that the question of the defendant 
Lambeth's solvency on December 5, 1953 should be con-
trolling and that the court erred in making no finding 
thereon (plaintiff's brief 23). All the sections of Utah's 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act so frequently cited by the 
plaintiff contemplate solvency as defined by 25-1-2, UGA .. 
1953, and relate to the financial condition of the trans-
feror at the time of the alleged fraudulent conveyance 
or conveyances. The latest date that the court could find 
that the transfers in issue took place was the recording 
date of J\i[ay 18, 1953, and Lambeth ~s assets at that time 
consisted of a joint interest with Es1neier of virtually 
all the stock in a corporation that by the plaintiff's own 
testimony had assets worth in exeess of $1-±3,000.00 (R. 
137 -139) a short three Inonths before and which had 
obligations of $57,850.00. There is no evidence to show 
a diminution in the value as of 1\lay lS, 1953 at any place 
in the record. 
La1nbeth could no more conteinplate that the present 
fair salable value of his assets was less than the a1nount 
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required to pay his existing liabilities as they became 
absolute and final (see 25-1-2, UCA 1953) on May 18, 
1953 than he could when he paid the plaintiff and his 
brother $16,000.00 on February 18th of the same year, 
only ninety days before. There is no evidence that the 
fa~r salable value. of the assets was less in May 1953 than 
in February 1953 and the only evidence of the value in 
February is that of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's 
brother Bertrand, both of whom were parties to the sale 
of stock and each a payee of the notes upon which this 
suit was originally instituted. 
(b) THERE IS A WEALTH OF EVIDENCE OF CON-
SIDERA'TION FOR THE TRANSFER OF THE REAL ES-
TATE AND SHEEP OPERATION REPRESENTED BY EX-
HIBITS 7, 8, 9 AND 10. 
In its Findings of Fact, the trial court found that 
(a) Lambeth was not insolvent at the time of the 
conveyance of the property, both real and chattel by 
deeds Exhibits 7, 8, and 9, and bill of sale Exhibit 10 
(Findings 15, 16, 17, and 18, R. 90-91). (b) There 
was consideration for the transfer (R. 88). (c) He was 
not indebted except for debts secured by mortgages 
on the transferred property at either the time of execu-
tion of the documents or at the time of delivery of the 
documents (Findings 6 and 7, R. 88). 
Our Fraudulent Conveyance Act, Title 25, Chapter 
1, UCA 1953, makes a voluntary conveyance fraudulent 
only when: 
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1. It makes the transferor insolvent as set forth in 
25-1-2, UCA 1953. 
2. When the transferor is about to engage In a 
business with an unreasonably small capital. 
3. When he intends to or believes that he will incur 
debts beyond his ability to pay (25-1-6, UCA 1953). 
4. To hinder, delay, or defraud creditors (25-1-7, 
UCA 1953) with claims either matured or not matured. 
If the transfer is not voluntary but is for a fair 
consideration (25-1-3) the transfer is not fraudulent, even 
though misfortune or bad business judgment makes the 
transferor insolvent shortly thereafter unless there is 
an express showing that the transfer was a mere device 
to create a trust for the transferor with the intent to de-
fraud future creditors. 
In the present suit the plaintiff in order to prevail 
must establish that the transfer of the real and personal 
property conveyed to the sons by Frank Lambeth ren-
dered him insolvent at the time of the transfer, whether 
that be on delivery of the deeds and bill of sale in the 
su1runer of 1952 or on the date of recordation, ~Ia:~ 18, 
1953. In addition to such insolYency, the plaintiff 1nust 
overcome the trial court's finding of fair consideration. 
Overcoming one finding without overconring the other 
is insufficient in the absence of a showing of actual 
fraudulent intent and the evidence supporting each find-
ing serves to negative any such intent. 
In discussing the consideration for the transfers, the 
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whole of the evidence shows that the father was not only 
indebted to the four sons for years of work during their 
majority for which they were never fully paid, but goes 
above and beyond a fair consideration to the point that 
it is apparent without the labor of the sons the chattel 
property and the grazing land would have never been 
accumulated (see Lambeth's testimony, T. 192). 
Q. In 1950, what would you say was the fair 
market value~ 
A. Excuse me, Keith, what year did we get the 
Dr. McCormick place~ 
The boys worked with the father in acquiring the sheep, 
camp equipment, and land, and at least two of the boys, 
Thallo and Keith, had passed their majority at the in-
ception of the business in 1934. 
The bill of sale itself, Exhibit 10, sets forth the con-
sideration of $1.00 "and in consideration of the continual 
labor and help they have given without pay." 
It is apparent from the instruments themselves that 
the property was transferred and received for the con-
sideration of work and labor done. Had the transfers 
been in the nature of a testamentary disposition or a gift 
as maintained by the plaintiff, Lambeth's three daugh-
ters would have undoubtedly shared equally with their 
brothers rather than being granted a one-seventh un-
divided interest in a piece of property valued at $600.00 
to $700.00, with no interest whatsoever in the range land, 
house, or sheep operation. 
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Before a detennination as to fair consideration for 
the sheep operation and the land may be made, there 
1nust be a basis for determining the value of the land 
and chattels. The only guide to such value is in the testi-
Inony of Frank Lambeth at T. 193 et seq. vVith regard 
to the value in 1950, Lambeth testified that the range 
land was probably worth $15.00 an acre. The deeds 
show approximately 1,000 acres or $15,000.00, the sheep 
value $24,000.00 for the 1600 head (T. 193), horses and 
equipment $2,500.00 (T. 194), thus making a total of 
$41,500.00. 
He testified that the value would be lower iii 1953 
(T. 194). There was on the sheep, equipment and range 
land a Inortgage to the Bank of Southern r tah in the 
sum of $31,000.00 (T. 195). In addition to the sheep and 
range land, there ·was the horne in Cedar City valued 
variously at $14,000.00 ( T. 192) and $18,000.00 ( T. 193) 
and three and one-half acres of farm ground in Iron 
County valued at $200.00 per acre or $600.00 to $700.00 
for the entire piece (T. 19:2) ..... ~fter deducting the $31,-
000.00 note and n1ortgage to the Bank of Southern Utah, 
there would be left a Inaxilnurn value of about $25,000.00 
deeded to the four boys, not taking into consideration 
the one-seventh interest each, held by the three girls in 
the farm ground. 
There is no other basis of valuation of the property 
in the evidence produced at the trial. 
As to the consideration that the boys had worked on 
the sheep operation without drawing regular wages since 
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the year 1934, we agree with the plaintiff's statement 
that a parent is entitled to the labors of his minor chil-
dren without consideration. However, the evidence 
shows at the time of trial that rr,hallo Lambeth was 49 
years old, Keith 47, Ellis 43, and Aubra 37 (T. 181). 
Therefore, Lambeth had not been entitled to Thallo's 
labor since 1930, Keith's since 1932, Ellis' since 1937, and 
Aubra's since 1942. Up to 1950, when the deeds were 
executed, the labor and assistance in the business for 
"'\vhich the boys were not ever fully paid consisted of 16 
years for Thallo and Keith, 13 years for Ellis, and 8 
years for Aubra that were not a matter of right in Frank 
Lambeth under the law. Of course, at the time the deeds 
were delivered ~ 1952, there would be an additional 2 
years for each of the four boys. 
Frank Lambeth testified as to the work of the boys 
since 1934. Keith, Ellis, and Aubra testified as to their 
work and the basis of their pay and all four testified as 
to the services of Thallo, who was with the sheep at the 
time of trial (T. 401-502). The court found after con-
sideration of all the testimony, together with the docu-
ments entered as set forth in Finding No. 8 (R. 88) : 
"That Frank Lambeth's sons had rendered 
services in assisting him in operating said sheep 
and grazing land during a period of more than 
twenty years prior to 1952 and had not drawn full 
wages for such services, but had worked with the 
expectancy of receiving an interest in the property 
when Frank Lambeth had retired or died. That 
evidence does not show even approximately the 
amount earned or the amount received by said 
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sons from said sheep operation, but it appear3 
that each of them, and particularly Keith, had 
earned much more than they received from the 
sheep operation." 
This finding is fully supported by the evidence and 
is sufficient to support a basis of fair consideration. 
(c) THE TRANSFER BEING PRIOR TO THE 
TIME THE GIVANS BECAME CREDITORS OF LAMBETH, 
A SHOWING OF A·CTUAL INTENT TO DEFRAUD IS NEC-
ESSARY WHETHER THE TRANSFER WAS FOR FAIR 
CONSIDERATION OR, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS VOL-
UNTARY. 
The only evidence with regard to manual deliverv 
of the deeds shows the deeds were delivered uncondition-
ally by Frank Lambeth to Keith Lambeth during the 
summer of 1952. Keith places the date of delivery as 
July, 1952. The court, in its findings (R. 88) following 
the special interrogatories of the advisory jury, finds 
the delivery to be in August or Septe1nber. There is no 
evidence whatsoever refuting this n1anual delivery. 
There is, further, no evidence to show that Frank 
Lambeth was insolvent at the time of tllis transfer nor 
that he contemplated becon1ing a creditor of the Givans. 
Title 25, Chapter I, UCA 1953, 1nakes it apparent that 
a voluntary transfer is effective and not fraudulent if it 
does not make the grantor insolvent or is not to defraud 
1natured or unmatured creditors nor is a de,ice contem-
plated to hinder or delay such creditors. La1ubeth did 
not becmne a creditor of the Givans until February lS, 
1953, and at that time by the Givan brothers' own state-
Inent as to the value of the assets of GiYans, Inc., beca1ne 
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the holder of sufficient assets at their then salable value 
to meet his existing obligations as they became due and 
payable. What can be better evidence of the value of 
assets than the statement of the adverse party or parties 
to a lawsuit regarding the sale of those assets~ It must 
be concluded that under the circumstances, as shown by 
all the evidence in this case, there 1nust be a showing 
of actual intent to defraud at the time of conveyance to 
hold these conveyances to be fraudulent even were this 
court to reverse the lower court on its finding that the 
transfers were for consideration and not voluntary. True, 
in the Ogden State Bank case, 12 Utah 13, 40 Pac. 765, the 
court's decision arose from evidence that a voluntary 
conveyance rendered the defendant insolvent and went 
on a doctrine of constructive fraud as to existing credi-
tors. In the present case, the court found Frank Lambeth 
to be solvent at all times material to the question of 
transfer of the property and also found the transfers 
to be for consideration rather than voluntary. Plaintiff 
also relies upon the case of Gustin v. Mathews, 25 Utah 
168, 70 Pac. 402. It is interesting to note that the case 
was a husband-wife situation, and this court does not and 
has never considered the parent-child relationship in the 
same nature as that of the husband and wife relationship. 
With reference to the above statement, we quote from 
Judge Wolfe's dissenting opinion in Lund v Howell, 92 
Utah 232, 67 P. (2d) 215, at page 219 of the Pacific 
citation: 
"A husband and wife embark on the voyage 
of life together, expecting to meet the waves to-
-a_ 
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gether, devoting to the support of themselves and 
children, and to his success, their common efforts 
and their several means. She is always willing, 
from affection for her husband and interest in his 
success, to extend him the help of her means, his 
business interests being in a large sense her inter-
ests, she never expecting any return of the means 
she commits to his hands; and if, after he has had 
those means employed in his business for years, 
mingled indiscriminately with his, it were per-
mitted her, when misfortune overtakes him, to 
raise up loans to the prejudice of his creditors, 
and support them by his own and her evidence, 
after creditors had trusted him in total ignorance 
of such loans, and allow him to use his means in 
purchasing real estate in her name, a wide road 
would be laid out for the promotion of v.Tong 
against honest creditors." 
Judge Wolfe, later in his opinion, refers to such conduct 
as the wife refuge racket, and plaintiff's counsel would 
attempt to name the conveyance here being litigated as a 
parent-child refuge racket. However, this is not the case, 
the law being explicit here and elsewhere that a child 
working for his parent is entitled to the fruits of his 
labor after attaining his majority. 
(d) 'THE DELIVERY IN THE SUMMER OF 1952 DOES 
NOT SHOW AN INTENT ON THE PART OF FRANK LAM-
BETH TO DIVEST HIMSELF OF HIS PROPERTY IMMEDI-
ATELY BEFORE ENTERING INTO A SUBSTANTIAL 
BUSINESS IN WHICH HE CONTEMPLATED CONTRACT-
ING DEBTS BEYOND HIS ABILITY TO PAY. 
The trial court found delivery of the deeds and bill 
of sale in question by a 1nanual transfer of possession 
from Frank Lambeth to l(eith Lambeth, one of the grant-
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ors in the instru1nents. The nature of the delivery itself 
is significant. The testimony shows that the deeds had 
been in the possession of Frank Lambeth in the smne 
house where Keith was living and where Keith had access 
to the deeds. However, this was not sufficient in the 
mind of Frank Lambeth and the evidence shows that he 
handed the deeds to Keith to be kept at such place as 
l{eith desired to keep them and entirely out of the control 
of Frank Lan1beth, and the act of the grantor in giving 
of the deeds and the grantees in the acceptance of the 
deeds by Keith Lambeth excluding the control and pos-
session of Frank Lambeth is adequate evidence as to the 
intent of the parties. This court set forth in Stanley v. 
Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P (2d) 465, the following lan-
guage at headnote 5: 
" 'Delivery' of a deed is essentially -a matter 
of intent which intent is to be arrived at from all 
facts and surrounding circumstances." 
The lower court found that a delivery had been made. 
This court also in the Stanley case, at page 466 of the 
Pacific citation, quoting Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 
:214 Pac. 313, 315, and cases cited thereunder, as follows: 
"The scope of the review on appeal in equity 
cases is clearly settled in this jurisdiction. 'This 
court is authorized by the state Constitution to 
review the findings of the trial courts in equity 
cases, but the findings of the trial courts on con-
flicting evidence will not be set aside unless it 
1nanifestly appears that the court has misapplied 
proven facts or made findings clearly against the 
weight of the evidence.' " 
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The plaintiff attempts to tie in the contract between Es-
meier, Lambeth and the Givans dated in October, 1952, 
as purporting to show that Lambeth made the transfer 
in the belief that he would incur debts beyond his ability 
to pay as they matured, as provided by Section 25-1-6, 
UCA 1953, and further, that Lambeth finally did in 
February, 1953, enter into a business transaction which 
on its face appears to be for the purchase of stock from 
the Givan brothers, with the payment of $16,000.00 on a 
$50,400.00 obligation, plaintiff contending this is an un-
reasonably small capital. However, the evidence as a 
whole would indicate that the $16,000.00 paid is roughly 
331;3% of the purchase price of the stock purchased, and 
was not business capital for the operation of Givans, Inc., 
but was paid to the Givan brothers for the purchase of 
stock. It is also important to note that the Givan brothers 
secured their notes for the other $34,500.00 on the stock 
purchased not by a mortgage of real property or a 
chattel mortgage of chattel property, but expressly by 
holding recourse to the stock purchased. 
(e) BADGES OF FRAUD. 
As the plaintiff points out in his citation fro1n 37 
C.J.S., page 922, the so-called "badges of fraud" a1nount 
to little more than suspicious circlnnstances. It would 
seem that there is not a suit alleging a fraudulent con-
veyance in this or any other jurisdiction in which some 
of the so-called badges of fraud are not contended by the 
plaintiffs. However, the crux of a fraudulent conveyance 
suit must depend upon a e01nbination of insolYency of 
the transferor caused by a transfer of property. and 
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lack of a fair consideration for such transfer. In the 
event of fair consideration or a failure to prove insol-
vency, there can be no fraud against creditors, and such 
so-called badges of fraud as may arise create an infer-
ence that is readily overcome by the evidence of fair 
consideration and solvency. 
True, there are certain inconsistencies pointed out 
by the plaintiff in the testimony of Frank Lambeth but, 
read as a whole, the testimony is straightforward and 
not inherently improbable. Such inconsistencies arise at 
any time when a seventy-five year old man is kept on the 
stand by a clever attorney through approximately half of 
518 pages of transcript, especially when all the incidents 
testified to are at least four years in the past and many 
of them going back eight, ten, and fifteen years, and as 
the Oregon Supreme Court stated in its discussion of the 
badges of fraud in the American Surety Company of 
Xezc York vs. Hattrem, 3 P.(2d) 1109: 
"The learned trial judge, who heard the wit-
nesses and saw their dmneanor upon the stand, 
was in a better position to judge of the strenuou~ 
effort made, if any, to color the testimony, and 
was in a better position to pass upon the goon 
faith of ~1:rs. Hattrem than is this court." 
(f and g) THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTION THAT FRANK LAMBETH RE-
TAINED THE LAND OR GOODS IN HIS POSSESSION OR 
UNDER HIS CONTROL. 
All the evidence by all parties indicates that Frank 
Lambeth did very little work regarding the sheep oufit 
------ -~--- l.l 
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after 1947, and that subsequent to 1950, he did practically 
no work. Even the testimony of the plaintiff and his 
brother indicates that during the period when the Givans, 
Inc. garage was on the South Main Street property close 
to the Lambeth home, which is one of the pieces of 
property in controversy, that the Givan boys saw Frank 
Lambeth almost daily, see the testimony of Edwin Givan 
(T. 386-387). 
Q. With reference to your knowledge of Mr. 
Lambeth's business, you were aware of ·where 
Mr. Lambeth lived, were you not~ 
A. I was. 
Q. That was very close to your place of business? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Lambeth frequently~ 
A. Very frequently, yes. 
Q. Almost every day when you were in town~ 
A. That is correct. 
This serves to show that 1\lr. Lambeth was not in pos-
session of sheep or sheep equipment, but was living in 
town, which was known to the Givans and w·as seeing th~ 
Givans almost every day. La1nbeth's testin1ony was to 
the effect that he had not been on the Kane County prop-
erty for some time and had not done work thereon for 
years. The possession of the home by La1nbeth was not 
exclusive, the Givan boys being aware as 'vas the rest 
of the com1nunity, that l{eith was living there with his 
wife and fa1nily and Thallo lived there when not "·ith 
the herd. 
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The jury, in its advisory capacity, after listening to 
all the evidence found in the special interrogatories with 
respect to the deeds evidenced by Exhibits 7, three and 
one-half acres of farm land (R. 81, paragraphs hand i). 
Exhibit 8, the Kane County grazing land (R. 82, para-
graphs h, i, and j), and the bill of sale, Exhibit 10 (R. 84, 
paragraphs h and i) that Frank Lambeth in August, 
1952, delivered possession with the intention of passing 
title and ownership at that time and without any retention 
of rights in the control, use, or benefit of the property. 
The jury found with respect to Exhibit 9, the deed for 
the house and lot in Cedar City (R. 83, paragraph hand 
i) that Frank Lambeth in 1952 transferred that property 
with the intention of passing title and ownership, with 
the understanding that he had a right to reside there 
(R. 83, paragraphs hand i). 
The trial court, after hearing the same evidence 
heard by the jury, and having considered certain other 
evidence relating to the solvency of Lambeth which was 
withheld from the jury and having been advised by the 
jury's answers to the interrogatories, made findings con-
sistent with those interrogatories, though not in any way 
bound to do so. It is also noteworthy that each of the 
interrogatories answered by the jury was a unanimous 
finding (R. 81, 82, 83, and 84), indicating that all person'S 
involved, to wit, the judge and the eight jurors who heard 
the evidence and examined the exhibits and were in the 
best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses, 
made the same findings with respect to the questions of 
delivery, retention of possession, and intent to defraud. 
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Considering that these nine persons were able to see and 
hear the witnesses and were consistent in their findings 
showing an absence of fraud, great weigth should be given 
thereto by the reviewing court. That the appellate court 
may review the evidence as well as the law in an equity 
proceeding is conceded, but the cases are legion holding 
that the appellate court must affirm unless the findings 
of the trial court are clearly erroneous, see Olivero v. 
Eleganti, supra, also Hall v. Hall, 7 Utah 2d 413, where as 
late as June, 1958, this court held: 
"In an equity case the Supreme Court must 
affirm unless the trial court's conclusion is obv?-
ously against the evidence." 
The plaintiff cites Clark v. Porter, 68 P. (2d) 8±-1, an 
Oklahoma case, as authority for his vie·w on possession. 
It should be noted that that case is based on a statute 
requiring a change of possession and not a change of 
ownership, and is not applicable here. The plaintiff fur-
ther cites Anderson v. Cou,rtney, 218 P. (2d) 261, another 
Oklahoma case involving the validity of a transfer of 
personal property between a first transferee and a sub-
sequent purchaser of the same property, and involYe~ 
the question of necessity of possession as related to sub-
sequent purchasers and not to the rights of creditors. 
(h) THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE 
·CREATION OF A TRUST FOR FRANK LAMBETH. 
The cases cited by the plaintiff under this point. two 
California cases and a l{ansas case. correctly state the 
law with regard to situations where there is an atten1pt 
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to pass nominal title to property in an obvious attempt 
to defeat the demands of creditors. The evidence herein 
discussed by both plaintiff's and defendants' briefs in 
Points 1 and 2 clearly indicates that the property herein 
involved was transferred for a valuable consideration 
and during a period while the transferor was solvent, 
and therefore, does not create a trust in fraud of credit-
ors. 
POINTS 2. and 3. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN PARA-
GRAPHS 6 AND 7 OF THE JUDGMENT. 
The trial court entered its findings, conclusions and 
judgment after consideration of all the evidence, both 
testamentary and documentary. 
The 518 pages of transcript hold a wealth of evidence 
to sustain the findings and the findings are sufficient 
to support the judgment. In addition to the testamentary 
evidence, the deeds themselves, and particularly the bill 
of sale of the sheep and equipment, together with the 
testimony as to date of delivery and the years of work 
and labor without pay amply support the findings and 
conclusions and paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment 
of the trial court. 
POINTS 4, 5, and 6. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUSTAINING DEFEND-
ANTS' OBJECTION 'TO PROFFERED EXHIBITS 13, 14, 15, 
AND THE DEPOSITION OF THE WITNESS SCOVILLE. 
Plaintiff contends that the court erred in refusing to 
admit certain evidence proffered as Exhibits 13, 14, and 
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15, and deposition of one Scoville, as agent of the Pacific 
Finance Company. 
Exhibit 13 is a note and mortgage to Pacific Finance 
Company by Givans, Inc., dated May 14, 1953 which 
states on its face that it was for "value received." The 
court sustained defendants' objection to the exhibit on 
the ground that the mortgage was given to secure a 
note for consideration obtained at that time and would 
make no difference in the assets of Frank Lambeth. 
Plaintiff contends that the mortgage was given to secure 
an indebtedness incurred by financing cars sold by 
Esmeier (plaintiff's brief 65). There is no evidence to 
support this statement by the plaintiff and the exhibit 
was properly rejected. 
Exhibit 14 is a mortgage given by Givans, Inc. to 
one L. C. Miles on July 1, 1953 and is on its face and by 
plaintiff's admission a renewal of the $5,000.00 obligation 
to Miles that is set forth in the original stock purchase 
agreement between the parties on January 6, 1953. It is, 
therefore, of no probative value with regard to a change 
of financial condition of Givans, Inc. between February 
18, 1953 and May 18, 1953. 
Exhibit 15 consists of certain pleadings, stipulations 
and related papers in a suit in which none of the parties 
to the present suit were parties. The court's sustaining 
the objection to the admission of Exhibits 15 a through 
h was entirely proper (T. 22-1). 
The deposition of Richard B. Scoville was partially 
read into the record (T. 373-376), whereupon the court 
sustained an objection so far as allowing the reading of 
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the deposition before the jury, but received the deposi-
tion for consideration of the court (T. 377). Again, at 
the risk of repetition, we must point out that the final 
determination of this matter was for the court and not 
the jury, and that the court Inust be presumed to have 
fully considered such deposition. 
POINT 7. 
THERE IS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S F AlLURE TO 
ADMIT FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE JURY EVI-
DENCE CONSISTING OF THE LAMBETHS' CHECKING 
ACCOUNT FROM JUNE 1952 TO AND INCLUDING AUGUST 
1953. 
This case being a matter in equity, the jury sat only 
m an advisory capacity and the court was not bound 
by the findings of the jury. The parties stipulated that 
the checks could be considered for all issues to be deter-
mined by the court (R. 463-464). 
The case being equitable, all issues were for the de-
termination of the court, the court being at liberty to 
accept or deny any or all advisory interrogatories an-
swered by the jury. 
POINT 8. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
:.IOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
The case being equitable and for the determination 
of the court, and the jury's findings being advisory in 
nature only and not in any way binding on the court, the 
court's denial of the motion for directed verdict by the 
plaintiff as well as the motion for directed verdict by the 
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defendants was immaterial and consisted of nothing more 
than the court's taking the case under advisement. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION REGARDING THE LA \r 
The plaintiff, in his discussion regarding all points 
beginning on page 67 of paintiff's brief, cites certain 
cases and comments thereon, and we feel it necessary to 
distinguish and differentiate certain of those cases and 
to set forth further authority. 
The case of Randall v. Tracy-Collins Trust Co., G 
Utah 2d 18, 305 P (2d) 480, is a suit for specific perform-
ance of an oral contract. This court affirmed on the 
basis that the evidence was not so vague and uncertain 
that the finding of the trial court was erroneous. 
Both Adams v. Silver Shield J!ining and Jlilling 
Company and Gustin v. llfathews, cited by the plaintiff, 
were cases where the transfers were voluntary and the 
transfers also made the transferor insolvent. Zuniga Y. 
Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P. (2d) 513, involved a transfer 
from the father to daughters while an action for dmnages 
was pending, the deeds were not recorded until eight 
days prior to filing of the judg1nent in that action. In 
that case, the trial court found the transfer to be fraudu-
lent due to lack of a fair consideration and due to in-
solvency of the defendant caused by the transfer. The 
appellate court held consistent with fonner holdings of 
the Supreme Court that the trial court was to be upheld 
unless the weight of the evidence was against the trial 
court's finding. The Supre1ne Court affinned the trial 
court's finding. 
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In the plaintiff's citation of American Surety Com-
pany of New York v. H attrem, supra, plaintiff makes his 
own paraphrasing (see page 72 of plaintiff's brief) of a 
purported simile arising between a conveyance frorn 
husband to wife and, on the other hand, a conveyance 
from parent to children. This comparison is not war-
ranted by the law. 
The American Surety case is also interesting with 
regard to the discussion of "badges of fraud," and that 
court states at page 1111 of the Pacific citation: 
"The learned trial judge, who heard the wit-
nesses and saw their demeanor upon the stand, 
\vas in a better position to judge of the strenuous 
effort made, if any, to color the testimony, and 
was in a better position to pass upon the good 
faith of nirs. Hattrem than is this court." 
Again the appellate court affirmed the trial court. 
Similarly, the trial judge in the present case was in 
a better position to pass on the good faith of the defend-
ants in this action, both the transferor and the transfer-
ees. Also, he was supported by the unani1nous advisory 
answers to interrogatories by a jury which also heard 
the testimony and was able to observe the demeanor 
of the witnesses upon the stand, and such answers are 
consistent with the findings of the trial court. 
In Ogden State Bank v. Barker, supra, again the 
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 
In Stanley v. Stanley, supra, cited by plaintiff at pag~ 
46, the trial court found from the facts before it that 
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there had been no delivery of a deed in evidence between 
a husband and wife, there being a wealth of evidence that 
the grantor had remained in possession and control of the 
premises deeded for a period of twenty-one years after 
execution of the deed. This court affirmed the findings 
of the trial court under the long-established rule that 
in equity cases the reviewing court should not overturn 
the judgment of the trial court unless the trial court's 
findings are clearly erroneous. 
Smith v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P. (2d) 264, cited 
by plaintiff at 1270, is one of the few cases found by 
either plaintiff or defendant where the Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court, and in that case found the error 
to be in the trial court's findings from the evidence that 
the conveyances were fraudulent. The Supreme Cou.rt 
reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the 
action. 
Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 15 P (2d) 1051, cited 
by the plaintiff at page 80, again affirms the general 
rule that the trial court's findings should not be dis-
turbed unless clearly wrong. In that case, the Supreme 
Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, that case 
being a question of mortgage foreclosure rather than 
a direct conveyance. 
In Webster v. Peterson, -!6 P. (2d) 676, the trial court 
found a nwrtgage given by a husband to a wife covering 
his undivided one-half joint interest in a farn1 to be 
in fraud of creditors, the trial court having found that 
the note and mortgage were given to defraud the plain-
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tiff and prevent hi1n from collecting the amount due on 
his judgment. The defense was that the mortgage was for 
a valuable consideration and not fraudulent. In a dis-
cussion of headnote 5 thereof, the Supreme Court holds 
that the recitation of valuable consideration on a note is 
written evidence of a debt then created and thereafter 
existing and owing. This case is important both due to 
the Supreme Court's reversal of the trial court in finding 
the Inortgage not to be fraudulent in spite of the husband 
and wife relationship, but also with regard to the plain-
tiff's points 4, 5, and 6 regarding a similar note and mort-
gage from Pacific Finance to Givans, Inc. also reciting 
on its face a valuable consideration. 
Referring again to the Stanley v. Stanley case, cited 
supra, Judge Wolfe in his concurring opinion cites a 
great number of cases, including the majority of cases 
cited by both plaintiff and defendant in this action, many 
of those cases referring directly to fraudulent conveyance 
actions and all regarding the findings and opinions of the 
trial judge when considered by an appellate court in an 
appeal from an equitable action. Justice Wolfe in that 
concurring opinion collects many of the cases by this 
court and all those cases indicate that the opinion of the 
trial judge must be considered to the point that even 
though there be a preponderance of evidence against the 
trial court's conclusions, the appellate court should af-
firm. 
The appellant and plaintiff points out at pages 20 
and 21 of his brief, citing from 37 C.J.S., Section I, page 
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852, that "creditors are a favored class and preservation 
of their rights is a fundamental policy in law." 
Purchasers for value are also to be protected by the 
law, and a conveyance is not to be found fraudulent as to 
creditors and therefore invalid unless there is both :1 
voluntary conveyance and a conveyance creating or tend-
ing to create willful insolvency. In this case there is 
neither. 
CONCLUSION 
From a voluminous record, including four days of 
trial with regard to the fraudulent conveyance part of 
this suit following two days of trial on the portion ?f 
the suit as to the validity of the notes, and after taking 
the matter under advisen1ent to review the documentary 
evidence submitted, being fully cognizant of the advisory 
interrogatories answered by the jury, the learned trial 
court found that the three deeds and the bill of sale al-
leged to be fraudulent were valid, were delivered for a 
valuable consideration, and were delivered and recorded 
while Frank Lambeth, the transferor, was solvent. The 
court had an1ple opportunity through several days of 
trial to observe the demeanor and detennine the credi-
bility of the transferor and three of the principal trans-
ferees. In fact, the transferor Lmnbeth was on the stand 
for the greatest part of two days in the last portion of 
the hearing. The trial court had mnple opportunity to 
determine his good faith in the transaction and lack of 
intent to defraud. The testinwn~- of all the defendants 
testifying, wlwn considered as a whole, is consistent and 
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impressive. Plaintiff argues that Lambeth and 
Esmeier, with reference to the assets of Givans, Inc., 
''reaped all the benefits from the disposition of the assets 
until Lundgren foreclosed his mortgage." There is no 
evidence as to the disposition of the assets and the evi-
dence affirmatively shows that Lambeth, the transferor, 
never took anything from the corporation. Plaintiff 
characterizes the transfers of property from the father, 
Frank Lambeth, to the sons as a father-children racket 
when there is no evidence to show either lack of consider-
ation for the transfers or the insolvency of the trans-
feror at the time of the transfers, or an intent upon the 
part of the transferor or transferees to defraud the plain-
tiff or the other persons on the notes given by Esmeier 
and Lambeth to the plaintiff, his brother Bertrand, and 
their wives. The cases cited both by the plaintiff in his 
able brief and by the defendant are consistent in holding 
that though the Supreme Court may review the evidence 
as well as the law in a proceeding of this nature, the 
opinion and findings of the trial judge, due to his more 
advantageous position in being able to view the demeanor 
and candor of the witnesses on the stand, must carry 
great weight, and that the Supreme Court must affirm 
unless it appears that the findings of the trial court were 
obviously in error. The voluminous record in this trial 
has been well stripped by the plaintiff in his lengthy 
brief in excerpting portions of testimony from the 518 
pages of transcript of testimony, the large sheaf of ex-
hibits, and the numerous pleadings, but the evidence con-
sidered as a whole is fully sufficient to support all find-
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ings and conclusions of the trial court and to support the 
trial court's decision in refusing the admission of certain 
exhibits proffered by the plaintiff. The trial court had 
for its consideration answers to interrogatories by a 
jury sitting for the purpose of advising the trial court 
as to certain findings of fact, and the eight jurors were 
unanimous in their findings, which findings are consist-
ent with the views of the trial court. 
Therefore, it is insisted that the findings, conclusions 
and decree were correct and in fact were the only equit-
able determination of the issues in this proceeding, and 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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